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WARRANTY OF TITLE

Donald J. Smythe*
Abstract: The risk of intellectual property infringement claims poses an
increasing threat to international trade. The UN Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is the most prevalent body of law
governing international sales. Important questions will inevitably arise,
therefore, under the CISG about the scope of the seller’s warranty of title.
Courts will be called upon to interpret Article 42 of the CISG, which provides a
warranty of title governing third-party intellectual property claims, or the
parties’ contract if they execute a customized warranty of title term. This Article
analyzes the appropriate scope of the seller’s warranty of title against thirdparty intellectual property claims under the CISG. It draws on the CISG’s
legislative history, the CISG case law, the underlying policy of the warranty of
title, and an important German Supreme Court precedent in an analogous case
to reject the “cloud on title” standard that has been applied in U.S. cases under
the Uniform Commercial Code. This Article argues instead that, unless the
parties’ contract clearly indicates otherwise, the seller under a CISG contract
should only be held liable for third-party intellectual property claims against the
buyer if (1) the buyer resells the goods in the seller’s jurisdiction and the claim
arises under the intellectual property laws in the seller’s jurisdiction, (2) the
buyer informed the seller about the third-party’s intellectual property rights
prior to contracting, or (3) due to special circumstances, such as the seller
having a branch in the jurisdiction under which the third-party’s intellectual
property rights are created, the seller—but not the buyer—knew or should have
known about the third-party’s intellectual property rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The risk of intellectual property infringement claims poses an
increasing threat to international trade. The diverse range of intellectual
property laws across the global economy and the proliferation of “patent
trolls” and “trademark squatters” have recently contributed to a plethora of
disquieting stories about intellectual property infringement claims
disrupting the smooth flow of international commerce, often at great
expense to the companies involved.1 It seems inevitable that important
questions about a seller’s liability for intellectual property infringement
claims against buyers will arise under the law of international sales. These
are at heart questions about the seller’s warranty of title under an
international sales contract.
The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG or the Convention) is the most important body of law governing
international sales; it has been adopted in eighty-three nation states,
including the United States, and most of the world’s major trading nations.2
In the United States the CISG applies with the full force of federal law to
most international sales transactions whenever a court determines that U.S.
law applies to a contract for the sale of non-household goods between
parties with places of business in different Contracting States (i.e., nation
states that have adopted the CISG).3 The CISG was the product of
negotiations between representatives from many nations with diverse legal
systems and traditions. As a consequence, the CISG’s rules are quite sparse
by comparison to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or other nations’
1

The media have reported on cases involving well-known companies with widely recognizable
brands, such as Starbucks, Penfolds, Tesla, and Pfizer, which have become embroiled in costly
trademark infringement suits with alleged trademark squatters. See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Trademark
Squatting On the Rise in the U.S., INSIDE COUNSEL MAGAZINE (May 1, 2010),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2010/05/01/trademark-squatting-on-the-rise-in-us; Sophie Brown, Brand
wars:
Battling
China’s
trademark
‘squatters’,
CNN
(July
17,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/asia/china-trademark-squatters-penfolds/. The media has also
reported on the proliferation of patent trolls and their threats to domestic and international commerce.
See, e.g., Patent trolls: Why no one likes them—Abuse of the patent system benefits neither inventors nor
the economy at large, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business-andfinance/21645604.
2
See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S.
TREATY
DOC.
N O.
98-9
(1983),
1489
U.N.T.S.
3
[hereinafter
CISG],
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf. The U.S. Senate
ratified the CISG in 1986, giving it the force of federal law when the Convention came into effect on
January 1, 1988. The count of “Contracting States” is as of September 26, 2014. See PACE LAW SCHOOL
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW, CISG: TABLE OF CONTRACTING STATES (Aug. 12,
2015), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgcountries/cntries.html.
3
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 1(a), 2(a). In some Contracting States the CISG might apply even if
the parties do not have places of business in different Contracting States. See id., art. 1(b). Of course, the
CISG allows parties to contract around its own rules in favor of others. See id., art. 6.
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domestic sales laws and it generally does not use the same commercial law
terms. The CISG, for instance, does not use the term “warranty of title”—or
even the word “warranty”—but it nonetheless states rules in Articles 41 and
42 that appear to be very similar to the warranty of title provisions in UCC
§ 2–312. For ease of reference, Articles 41 and 42 will be referred to in this
Article as the CISG’s “warranty of title” provisions.
A sale typically involves the conveyance of title to goods in return for
a price.4 The seller’s warranty of title thus plays a pivotal role. The broader
the warranty, the greater the assurance the seller provides to the buyer that
the goods will be free from defects in title that might give rise to claims
against the buyer after title has conveyed; of course, the broader the
warranty, the greater the seller’s potential liability for any claims against the
buyer’s title. Given the growing risks of intellectual property infringement
claims in a diverse global economy, important questions will inevitably
arise under the CISG about the scope of the seller’s warranty of title, and
courts will be called upon to interpret Article 42, which provides the
CISG’s warranty of title governing third-party intellectual property claims
against the buyer, or the parties’ contract if they execute a customized
warranty of title term.5
Courts will face challenges in interpreting Article 42 because the
language is not particularly clear and does not expressly answer some
important questions. Indeed, because the language is less than crystal clear,
parties may be inclined to draft customized warranty of title terms for their
contracts.6 But customized contract terms may also raise difficult questions
about their interpretation, since the parties may not anticipate all the
contingencies and circumstances that may give rise to warranty of title
issues. While similar interpretative questions have been addressed under the
UCC, international sales involve different circumstances than domestic
sales and the warranty of title under the CISG raises unique issues.
As a general matter, warranty of title issues can arise from nonintellectual property claims against the goods or intellectual property claims
against the goods. Under the UCC, U.S. courts have generally adopted the
“cloud on title” standard to determine whether the warranty of title under
4

The CISG itself does not expressly define the term “sale.” The UCC, however, states that “[a]
‘sale’ consists in the passing of tile from the seller to a buyer.” U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
5
The CISG has adopted the principle of party autonomy and respects the parties’ freedom of
contract as much as possible. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of
this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”). Id.
6
In fact, one distinguished commentator has advised that in important transactions the parties
should draft customized warranty of title provisions. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 398 (4th ed. 2009) (“In
important transactions in which third-party claims are possible, the buyer should insist on contractual
provisions that clearly state the protection that the seller provides in the case of third-party claims . . .
.”).
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UCC § 2–312(1) has been breached in cases involving non-intellectual
property claims against the goods. Although it is less than perfectly clear,
the cloud on title standard holds the seller liable not only for valid claims,
but also for those that, while not valid, are not clearly spurious and still
raise “colorable claims” against the buyer’s title.7 The case law construing
the scope of the seller’s warranty of title under UCC § 2–312(3), which
governs intellectual property claims, is not as well developed, but a recent
Californian case, Pacific Sunwear v. Olaes, has extended the cloud on title
standard to intellectual property claims as well as non-intellectual property
claims.8 If Pacific Sunwear is persuasive, a seller will be held liable under
the UCC for any colorable third-party intellectual property claim against the
buyer as well as colorable non-intellectual property claims.9
While the cloud on title standard may be appropriate for domestic
sales under the UCC, the unique characteristics of international sales make
it inappropriate for third-party intellectual property claims under the CISG.
In fact, international sales raise more difficult questions about the seller’s
liabilities for third-party intellectual property claims against the buyer than
domestic sales. In a purely domestic sale,10 the seller may reasonably be
presumed to have constructive or actual knowledge of any registered
intellectual property rights that might give rise to a third-party intellectual
property claim, since the rights would be registered or otherwise created
under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the seller is located. In fact, the
seller could be held liable for beaching an intellectual property right arising
in the seller’s own jurisdiction simply by virtue of manufacturing or selling
the good.11 It would be perfectly reasonable, therefore, to hold the seller
liable for a colorable third-party intellectual property claim, even if the
claim ultimately proved invalid. In an international sale, however, the seller
should not generally be presumed to have actual or constructive knowledge
of all intellectual property rights that might give rise to a third-party claim
against the buyer since the seller is not generally located in the jurisdiction
under which the third-party’s intellectual property rights are registered or
otherwise created; the buyer, on the other hand, often is.
This Article analyzes the appropriate scope of the seller’s liabilities
under Article 42 of the CISG. More specifically, it addresses whether the
7

See, e.g., Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 176 (S.D. 1995).
Pac. Sunwear of Cal, Inc. v. Olaes Enterprises, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 4th 466 (2008). The court
reasoned that the burden of nonfrivolous claims should be placed on the seller because the seller will
generally have superior knowledge of the existence of such claims. Id. at 470.
9
Id.
10
The term “purely domestic” sale as used here and elsewhere in this Article means a sale in which
the seller and buyer are both located in the domestic jurisdiction. Thus, it excludes sales that would be
governed by domestic law but in which the seller is located in a foreign jurisdiction.
11
See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability
in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1999).
8
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seller should be held liable under the CISG for a breach of the warranty of
title when a third–party makes an intellectual property claim against the
buyer based on an intellectual property right in the jurisdiction of the
buyer’s location or the jurisdiction in which the buyer resells the goods. It
draws on the underlying policy of the warranty of title in a sales transaction,
the CISG’s legislative history, the CISG case law interpreting Article 42,
and an important German Supreme Court precedent in an analogous case to
argue that, unless the parties’ contract clearly indicates otherwise, the seller
in a CISG contract should only be held liable for third-party intellectual
property claims against the buyer if (1) the buyer resells the goods in the
seller’s jurisdiction and the claim arises under the intellectual property laws
in the seller’s jurisdiction, (2) the buyer informed the seller about the thirdparty’s intellectual property rights prior to contracting, or (3) due to special
circumstances, such as the seller having a branch in the jurisdiction under
which the third-party’s intellectual property rights are registered or
otherwise created, the seller but not the buyer knew or should have known
about the third-party’s intellectual property rights.
The next section of this Article provides a brief overview of the
growing risks of intellectual property infringement claims in international
sales. The third section provides some background on the CISG, and the
fourth section elaborates on the CISG’s warranty of title provisions in
Articles 41 and 42. The fifth section discusses the legislative history of
Article 42, reviews the case law interpreting Article 42, and highlights the
most germane unanswered question: whether the seller or the buyer should
bear liabilities for a third-party intellectual property claim based on an
intellectual property right in the jurisdiction in which the buyer is located or
in the jurisdiction in which the buyer plans to resell the goods? The sixth
section draws on the underlying policy considerations and an important
German Supreme Court precedent in an analogous case to suggest a rule to
govern when the seller should be liable for third-party intellectual property
claims under the CISG. The last section concludes and offers a summary.
II. THE GROWING RISKS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES
Patent “trolls” and trademark “squatters” have recently made
prominent headlines.12 A patent troll is a person or company that purchases
patents from inventors, not in the hopes of actually using them for
productive purposes, but rather, in the hopes of using them to make patent
infringement claims against other persons or companies that are engaged in

12
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See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 1; Brown, supra note 1; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
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productive activities.13 A trademark squatter is a person or company that
acquires trademarks, not in the hopes of actually using them to help market
a product or service, but rather, in the hopes of making trademark
infringement claims against other persons or companies that do use them to
market their products or services.14 As the pejorative terms themselves
suggest, patent trolls and trademark squatters are widely alleged to create
costs and impediments to other companies and to global commerce
generally, and the incidence of patent trolling and trademark squatting is
widely alleged to be on the rise.15 Indeed, the threats to commerce have
motivated the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office to publicize the issues and offer prophylactic advice to
potential targets.16 Nonetheless, in spite of the efforts to combat them,17
patent trolls and trademark squatters likely pose increasing risks to
international sales.
In fact, intellectual property infringement claims likely pose particular
risks to international sales simply because of the diversity of intellectual
property laws across the global economy and the unfamiliarity of many
trading parties and potential trading parties with the laws outside their own
jurisdictions. For example, a report of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
suggests that U.S. patent holders have often lacked the awareness and
familiarity with the patent system in China necessary to protect themselves
against patent infringement claims by Chinese companies that are more
familiar with their domestic patent system.18 To confound matters, U.S.
patent holders have experienced difficulties in obtaining patents through
international filing mechanisms, such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization.19 Foreign
patent holders may experience similar difficulties acquiring patent
13

See, e.g., Patent Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patenttroll-victims (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). For a more through explanation, see Karen E. Sandrik,
Warranting Rightful Claims, 72 LA. L. REV. 873 (2012).
14
See, e.g., Scott Baldwin, Don’t Sit and Wait: Stopping Trademark Squatters, 4 INVENTORS EYE 1
(2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/custom-page/inventors-eye-don-t-sit-and-wait-stopping-trademarksquatters. For a more extended discussion, see Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Trademark Squatting, 31 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 252 (2013).
15
See, e.g., Sandrik, supra note 13; Sangsuvan, supra note 14, THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1;
James Bessen, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-innovation.
16
Baldwin, supra note 14; ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND,, supra note 13.
17
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) is
credited for making it more difficult to troll software patents, but although the number of patent
infringement cases in the United States declined in 2014, it remains high. See, e.g., Nicholas Wells &
Eric Chemi, Can’t Kill Off the Patent Trolls Yet, CNBC (May 19, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/19/.
18
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT ON PATENT ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 2 (2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/China_Report_on_Patent_Enforcement_%28FullRprt%29FINAL.pdf.
19
Id.
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protection in the U.S. Trademark squatting, on the other hand, has been
facilitated by the use of two different systems for registering trademarks:
the first-to-use system, which is prevalent in nations with common law
systems, and the first-to-file system, which is prevalent in nations with civil
law systems.20 Under the first-to-use systems, trademark squatting is rare
because the acquisition of trademark rights depends on their use,21 but the
first-to-file systems facilitate it because trademark squatters do not have to
invest in actually using the trademarks to acquire rights in them and are
therefore able to target well-known brands that have not yet been registered
in their jurisdictions.22
As a consequence, several companies with well-known products and
brands have become embroiled in highly publicized international
intellectual property infringement disputes. For example, Starbucks was the
target of a trademark infringement claim in Russia,23 Treasure Wine
Estates, which owns the Penfolds brand, was the target of a trademark
infringement claim in China,24 Tesla was also the target of a trademark
infringement claim in China,25 and Pfizer, which owns the Viagra brand,
was the target of both trademark and patent infringement claims in China.26
Although there are pressures on governments to rectify the problems, there
do not appear to be any imminent cures, and the threats to international
commerce will likely remain high for the foreseeable future.27 As the
volume of international trade increases, the risks of warranty of title claims
under the CISG will probably also increase. This will make the
interpretation of Article 42, as well as customized warranty of title contract
terms under the CISG , an important matter in the years to come.
III. THE CISG
The CISG was initially approved at a United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) conference in 1980 and went into
effect on January 1, 1988.28 Work on the CISG had been begun, however,
by UNCITRAL in 1968, and it was strongly influenced by work that the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) had
20

Sangsuvan, supra note 14, at 261.
Id. at 262.
22
Id. at 264.
23
Seidenberg, supra note 1.
24
Brown, supra note 1.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 14; Wells & Chemi, supra note 17.
28
JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 (1989).
21
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done on the unification of international private law over the three decades
prior to that.29 Although the CISG’s rules may seem spare by comparison to
most nations’ domestic laws, it was the product of considerable deliberation
and debate, as well as compromise and cooperation.
The purpose of unifying international private law was, in the words of
John Honnold, “to free international commerce from a Babel of diverse
domestic legal systems.”30 To that end, the drafters of the CISG recognized
that the greatest challenge would lie in the application of the new rules.
They worried, in particular, about a “homeward trend bias”— a tendency
for courts to draw on domestic law in interpreting CISG provisions,
whether expressly as a means of filling purported gaps in the CISG, or
implicitly in allowing domestic law to influence their interpretations and
applications of CISG rules and principles.31 Fortunately, to help mitigate
those concerns, scholars have endeavored to preserve the legislative history
of the CISG and to organize the documents and other materials to make
them accessible to courts, scholars, and students.32
IV. THE CISG’S WARRANTY OF TITLE
The CISG does not provide any titles for its provisions, and its
language does not use common law terms. Articles 41 and 42 of the CISG,
however, clearly state rules that are similar to the warranty of title
provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-312.33 Article 41
29

As Honnold explains, the initial UNCITRAL Working Group included representatives from
thirty-six nation states, including nine from Africa, seven from Asia, five from Eastern Europe, six from
Latin America, and nine from Western Europe and former Commonwealth nations. Id. at 1–3.
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., LARRY DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CISG JURISPRUDENCE 2–3 (2005); Harry M. Fletcher, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized
System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle
in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187, 200–04 (1998). See also U.N. Secretariat, Secretariat Commentary
on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=644#. The
commentary for Article 7 explains that “it is especially important to avoid different constructions of the
provisions of this Convention by national courts, each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal
system of the country of the forum.” Id. art. 7.
32
See HONNOLD, supra note 28. See also Albert H. Krtizer CISG Database, PACE L. SCH. INST.
INT’L COM. L., http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
33
U.C.C. § 2-312 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012):
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance
of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by specific language
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states that a seller must deliver goods which are free from any nonintellectual property right or claim of a third party unless the buyer agreed
to take the goods subject to such a right or claim.34 CISG Article 42 states
that a “seller must deliver goods which are free from any” relevant thirdparty intellectual property35 right or claim of which “the seller knew or
could not have been unaware” of at the time of contracting.36 For the sake
of Article 42, a relevant intellectual property right or claim is one arising
under “the law of the [nation in which] the goods will be resold or [] used,
if it was contemplated by the parties” that the goods would be resold or
used in that nation at the time of contracting or, “in any other case, under

or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not
claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third
person may have.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind
warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by
way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must
hold the seller harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance with the
specifications.
34

See CISG, supra note 2, art. 41, which states:
The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a third party, unless
the buyer agreed to take the goods subject to that right or claim. However, if such right or
claim is based on industrial property or other intellectual property, the seller’s obligation is
governed by Article 42.

35

The drafters intentionally used the words “industrial property or other intellectual property” in
Article 42 to ensure that the scope of the provision would be interpreted broadly, presumably by which
they meant that it would be interpreted to include trademark and copyright as well as patent claims,
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 334.
36
CISG, supra note 2, art. 42:
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a third party
based on industrial property or other intellectual property, of which at the time of the
conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been unaware, provided that the
right or claim is based on industrial property or other intellectual property:
(a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or otherwise used, if it was
contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract that the goods would
be resold or otherwise used in that State; or
(b) in any other case, under the law of the State where the buyer has his place of business.
(2) The obligation of the seller under the preceding paragraph does not extend to cases
where:
(a) at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been
unaware of the right or claim; or
(b) the right or claim results from the seller’s compliance with technical drawings, designs,
formulae or other such specifications furnished by the buyer.
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the law of the [nation in which] the buyer has its place of business.”37
Article 43 states a notice requirement that the buyer must meet to
preserve any rights under Articles 41 and 42. The buyer loses the right to
rely on Article 41 or 42 if the buyer fails to give the seller notice
“specifying the nature of the [third party’s] right or claim . . . within a
reasonable time,”38 although “the seller is not entitled to rely on” the
buyer’s failure to meet the notice requirement if the seller knew about the
third party’s right or claim and its nature.39 As a general matter, the notice
provisions under the CISG are significant because some courts have applied
them quite strictly.40 In this case, however, the notice provisions clearly also
place an awareness burden on the buyer; the buyer must provide notice
within a reasonable time of any third party rights or claims that the buyer
“ought to have become aware of . . . .”41 Much of the early discussion and
debate about the warranty of title under the CISG was about the buyer’s
notice requirements, and some participants believed they tilted the CISG
heavily in favor of the seller.42
V. BACKGROUND ON ARTICLE 42
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the CISG and the case law that
is easily accessible to U.S. and other English language courts do not shed
much light on the most important questions about the scope of the CISG’s
warranty of title. In particular, they do not clearly define when a seller will
be liable for third-party intellectual property claims against a buyer. They
do offer some glimmers of insight, but even those are obfuscated by
contradictory developments and opinions.
A. The Legislative History
It is significant that the CISG separated its warranty of title provisions
into two separate Articles. The initial drafts of the CISG protected the buyer
only against “claims” by a third party; some participants in the drafting
process expressed concerns that such third party “claims” would not extend
37

CISG, supra note 2, art. 42(1) (“[P]rovided that the right or claim is based on industrial property
or other intellectual property: (a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or otherwise
used, if it was contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract . . . or (b) in any
other case, under the law of the State where the buyer has his place of business.”).
38
CISG, supra note 2, art. 43(1) (“The buyer loses the right to rely on the provisions of article 41 or
article 42 if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the right or claim of the third
party within a reasonable time . . . .”).
39
CISG, supra note 2, art. 43(2) (“The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of . [Article
43(1)] . if he knew of the right or claim of the third party and the nature of it.”).
40
See infra Section IV.ii.(a).
41
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 43(1).
42
See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 107.
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to third party claims based on intellectual property rights.43 Additional
language was subsequently drafted to more clearly extend the warranty of
title to claims based on “industrial or intellectual property.”44 The Special
Working Group that drafted the language intended to limit the seller’s
liabilities for third party intellectual property rights or claims to those “of
which at the time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could
not have been unaware.”45 It is relevant that the word “ought” is not used—
the language does not place any burden on a seller to make itself aware of
potential third party intellectual property rights or claims. Even at that,
some participants in the discussions and debates apparently believed that
third party intellectual property rights and claims were simply too complex
to be addressed under the CISG.46
In fact, there was considerable concern about the scope of the CISG’s
warranty of title provisions throughout the drafting process. Early in the
process, before the drafting language was extended to cover the warranty of
title to intellectual property claims expressly, some participants raised
concerns that the word “claim” might be construed to hold the seller liable
for any third party claims, regardless of whether they were “frivolous or
vexacious.”47 Other representatives, however, argued that the word “claim”
could “only be interpreted to mean a valid or well-founded claim.”48 Indeed,
one representative expressed a concern that because the word “claim” was
ambiguous, the scope of a valid third party claim might be determined by
domestic laws rather than the CISG.49 Others appeared to feel the warranty
of title had little substance and might, if anything, simply create needless
confusion and litigation.50 One thing, however, is quite clear: there was no
agreement about the scope of the CISG’s warranty of title.
Later in the drafting process, after the 1977 UNCITRAL “Sales” Draft
had expressly extended the drafting language to cover a “right or claim
based on industrial or intellectual property,”51 UNCITRAL’s Committee of
43

Id. at 151.
Id. at 333.
45
This is the language used in the draft as well as the final language of CISG, Article 42(1). CISG,
supra note 2, art. 42(1).
46
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 334.
47
Id. at 107.
48
Id.
49
Id. This is a legitimate concern. Article 7(2) of the CISG states that if courts are unable to answer
a question using a CISG provision or general principles on which the CISG is based, they are to apply
choice of law rule sunder private international law and answer the question using the relevant domestic
legal rule. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(2) (“Questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.”).
50
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 128.
51
Id. at 333.
44
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the Whole52 adopted a proposal that the seller breached the warranty of title
if the buyer was rendered unable to resell or use goods because of a third
party intellectual property claim.53 Although this clarified that the warranty
of title provided a buyer with substantive protections against third-party
intellectual property claims, it still did not clarify what the word claim
meant—whether it meant a valid claim or any claim at all or something in
between. Since the word claim clearly had different meanings for different
participants in the earlier discussion and debates,54 the same ambiguity
about the scope of the CISG’s warranty of title provisions governing thirdparty non-intellectual property claims now extended to its coverage of
third-party intellectual property claims.
UNCITRAL produced a draft version of the CISG in 1978, which was
very similar to the final version of the CISG that was adopted in 1980. It
then requested that the Secretary-General of the UN provide a commentary
on the draft provisions. The Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft
Convention clearly suggests that sellers should bear extensive liabilities for
third party non-intellectual property right claims. The Commentary states
that the seller breaches its obligations not only when a third party’s nonintellectual property claim is valid, but even when the third party has
merely made a claim in respect of the goods.55 The Commentary clarifies,
however, that the seller’s liabilities do not extend to frivolous third party
claims, but it emphasizes that the seller has a burden to demonstrate to the
buyer that the claim is frivolous or, if the seller fails to do so to the buyer’s
satisfaction, the seller must take appropriate action to free the goods from
the third party’s claim.56
The Secretariat’s Commentary, however, clearly implies that sellers
should bear significantly less liabilities for third party intellectual property
claims. It observes that, while the seller is liable, at least to some extent, for
third-party intellectual property claims under most nations’ domestic laws,
that makes sense because the seller is usually both a producer and a seller
within its domestic legal system,57 but that the seller in an international
transaction should not normally be expected to have as much knowledge
about intellectual property rights in the buyer’s legal system as its own, and
that it is the buyer that typically decides where the goods will be used or
sold, sometimes after the sale has been concluded,58 and therefore the seller
52

UNCITRAL established the “Committee of the Whole” to evaluate the UNCITRAL “Sales”
Draft. The Committee established a Drafting Committee and several other subcommittees but it
discussed and debated the 1977 “Sales” Draft as a group. Id. at 318.
53
Id. at 334.
54
See discussion supra Section IV.
55
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 426.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 426–7.
58
Id. at 427.
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should not be liable for third party intellectual property claims under
international sales law to the same degree in all cases.59 Indeed, the
Commentary observes that the drafting language holds the seller liable only
if the seller “knew or could not have been unaware” of the third party
claim.60 It clarifies that “the seller could not have been unaware of the thirdparty claim if that claim was based on a patent application or grant which
had been published in the country in question.”61 However, it observes that
it is possible for a third-party to have “industrial or intellectual property”
rights or claims “even though there has been no publication” and in those
cases “the seller is not liable to the buyer.”62 Although the Commentary
does not define what it means by “no publication,” this is presumably a
reference to rights or claims based on unregistered trademarks or
copyrights.
The Commentary does, however, imply that there are limits to the
seller’s liabilities. Most importantly, it observes that the draft language
“provides that the seller is not liable to the buyer if at the time of the
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware
of the third-party’s right or claim.”63 Unfortunately, it does not help to
clarify when that would be the case—in other words, when it should be
deemed that the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of the thirdparty’s right or claim. If the Commentary intended that it should be deemed
a buyer could not have been unaware of a third-party claim based on a
published patent application or grant (obviously in the country in question)
then there would have been no point in previously stating that it should be
deemed a seller could not have been unaware of a third-party claim based
on a published patent application or grant. The seller would clearly bear no
liabilities for a third-party claim based on a published patent application or
grant. Moreover, it is only reasonable to presume that the Commentary
would state such an intention about the buyer’s liabilities expressly since it
had stated its intentions about the seller’s liabilities expressly.
Subsequent to the Secretariat’s Commentary, the UN General
Assembly convened a Diplomatic Conference to act on UNCITRAL’s
draft.64 The drafts of Articles 41 and 42 were deliberated and debated by the
First Committee (a Second Committee deliberated and debated the draft
provisions governing the CISG’s entry into force).65 The First Committee
debated the merits of separating intellectual property rights and claims from
non-intellectual property ones but ultimately adopted Articles 41 and 42 as
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
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drafted.66 Much of the real debate revolved around the scope of the seller’s
obligation under Article 42. The Canadian representative proposed an
amendment to Article 42 that was intended to prevent buyers from making
ill-founded claims and also to expedite settlement in cases in which the
buyer suffered no serious prejudice or inconvenience.67 Although the
Canadian representative withdrew the proposal, it was obviously motivated
by a concern that sellers could be liable for ill-founded or de minimus
claims as Article 42 had been drafted and the concern was shared by some
other representatives.68
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) representative proposed an
amendment that would limit the seller’s exposure to liabilities for claims
under Article 42 to two years. The proposal was supported by some other
representatives, including the one from Belgium who expressed a concern
that not limiting the period for which the seller would remain liable would
put too much of a burden on the seller to make inquiries into rights that it
was not well-equipped to do. The French representative, on the other hand,
argued that the buyer was in an even worse position than the seller to know
about such third-party rights.69 Although the representatives were clearly
divided on the GDR representative’s proposal, it was ultimately rejected.70
Nonetheless, it also reflected serious concerns about the seller’s liabilities
under Article 42.
Viewed as a whole, the legislative history of the CISG suggests an
almost complete reversal in the conception of the scope of the seller’s
liabilities for third-party intellectual property claims under Article 42. The
initial concerns about imposing the burden on the seller to acquaint itself
with foreign intellectual property rights systems that motivated a separate
warranty of title provision of third-party intellectual property claims were
never disclaimed but they appeared to be forgotten as the drafting process
continued, and by the time the CISG was adopted the prevalent view
appeared to be that the seller’s liabilities under Article 42 were as broad as
under Article 41. The Secretariat’s earlier concerns that the seller in an
international transaction should not normally be expected to have as much
knowledge about intellectual property rights in the buyer’s legal system as
in its own legal system, and that it is the buyer that typically decides where
the goods will be used or sold, sometimes after the sale has been
concluded,71 were not manifest in the discussions and debates at the
subsequent Diplomatic Conference. Of course, the failure of the Diplomatic
66
67
68

Id.

69
70
71

Id. at 549, 648.
Id. at 548.
The Dutch, Swiss, and Swedish representatives all expressed their sympathy with the concern.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 426–7.

523

36_3_2_SMYTHE FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

10/10/16 8:11 PM

36:509 (2016)

Conference to affirm those concerns does not negate them, nor should it
diminish their persuasiveness in the interpretation of Article 42.
B. The Case Law
One of the challenges in interpreting the CISG, and a challenge to
achieving uniformity in its application, arises from the fact that the case law
is written in multiple languages and translations of the cases are not easy to
find. Fortunately, the Pace Law School Institute of International
Commercial Law has compiled many translations of CISG cases from their
original languages to English.72 Although the case precedents are not
entirely uniform and do not answer the most germane questions, courts
have clearly found reasons not to hold sellers liable for third-party
intellectual property claims against the buyer. At least one case rejected a
buyer’s claim under Article 42 for the buyer’s failure to provide adequate
notice of an infringement claim under Article 43; other cases rejected
buyers’ claims because the buyer had prior knowledge of the intellectual
property infringement; only two cases address the scope of sellers’
liabilities under Article 42 directly and, although they interpreted them
differently, the more persuasive case interpreted them narrowly.
1. The Buyer’s Failure to Provide Notice Within a Reasonable Time
In a case involving plastic faceplates for mobile telephones,73 a
German court addressed whether the buyer met the notice obligations under
Article 43 as required to proceed with a claim under Article 42 for a
trademark infringement claim against the goods. The Austrian seller had
supplied the German buyer with plastic faceplates for its mobile phones
shortly before the market for mobile phones collapsed.74 In a suit against
the seller, the buyer subsequently claimed that many of the faceplates had
been confiscated because of a trademark infringement claim by Nokia
against the buyer, and that it had also been required to pay over $100,000
Euros in damages to Nokia to settle the trademark infringement claim.
Although the opinion did not clarify how long the buyer delayed in
providing notice of Nokia’s trademark infringement claim to the seller, it
held that the buyer did not comply with the duty to notify the seller about
Nokia’s claim under Article 43.

72

See
Cases
on
the
CISG,
PACE
L.
SCH.
INST.
INT’L
COM.
L.,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/caseschedule.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
73
Landgericht Köln [LG] [District Court] Dec. 5, 2006, 85 O 200/05 (Ger.),
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061205g1.html.
74
Id.
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2. The Buyer’s Prior Knowledge of Intellectual Property
Infringement
In a case involving blank CDs,75 a German seller, which had bought
the CDs from a Taiwanese company, resold them to an Austrian buyer. The
Taiwanese company apparently had a license to sell the CDs in Germany
but not in Austria.76 The buyer subsequently retained payment of the
contract price for the CDs on the grounds that it might be liable for payment
of license fees for the CDs.77 The seller disputed the buyer’s claim
contending that the buyer could not be held liable to the Taiwanese
company because there had been no breach of the license and disputed the
buyer’s right to retain payment.78 The Supreme Court of Austria held that
under Article 42 the seller had an obligation to deliver goods free of any
third-party right under the law of the jurisdiction in which the goods were to
be resold if this was contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting
or, in any other case, in the law of the jurisdiction in which the buyer had its
place of business.79 It observed that the lower court had failed to determine
where, at the time of contracting, the parties had contemplated the goods
would be resold and remanded the case for a determination.80 Presumably,
the seller would have been liable if it had been contemplated by the parties
at the time of contracting that the goods would be resold in a jurisdiction in
which they would have been subject to a third-party intellectual property
claim. What is perhaps most interesting about the Court’s opinion is that it
appears to construe the seller’s obligations under Article 42 so broadly. The
Court states that not only may valid third-party intellectual property claims
trigger the seller’s liability, but so might unjustified claims.81
In a case involving what the opinion described as counterfeit
furniture,82 a Spanish company sold furniture to two French buyers who
were subsequently subjected to intellectual property infringement claims by
another company. The resulting dispute was put to a French court which
had to decide, among other things, whether the seller should be liable for
the infringement claims under Article 42.83 The French court observed that
one of the buyers actually knew the furniture infringed on a third-party’s
75

Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 12, 2006, 10 Ob 122/05x,
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060912a3.html (Austria).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Versailles, Nov. 23,
2004, 01/08276 (Fr.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041123f1.html. The reference to “counterfeit
furniture” suggests the case involved a trademark infringement claim.
83
Id.

525

36_3_2_SMYTHE FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

10/10/16 8:11 PM

36:509 (2016)

rights and the other had consulted with professional designers and could not
have been unaware that the furniture was “counterfeit.”84 The court
observed that the furniture had been featured in magazine articles and
museums, and that previous infringement claims by the creator had been
widely reported in the news media.85 Both buyers own retail chains of
stores and were advised by professional designers who should have known
about the creator’s rights in the furniture.86 The case helps to clarify that the
provisions in Article 42 relieving the seller from liability when the buyer
could not have been unaware do at least have some real teeth, although it
does not clarify how much.
In a similar case involving printed textiles,87 another French court
clarified that the buyer’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of an
infringement trumps the seller’s liability under Article 42 even where the
seller clearly also knew about the infringement. In that case, a German
company sold printed textiles to a French company that another company
claimed infringed its intellectual property rights in the patterns.88 The seller
apparently had stores of its own in France and also knew that the fabrics
would be resold in France.89 This, of course, would normally implicate the
seller for liabilities under Article 42. According to the court, the buyer,
however, could not have been unaware of the infringement and this relieved
the seller of any liability for the infringement claims.90 The opinion does
not elaborate on why the buyer could not have been unaware of the
infringement, but does observe that the buyer operated six clothing stores in
eastern France and refers to its professional capacity.91 Since six clothing
outlets is, at best, a small chain, the opinion may suggest that the
circumstances in which courts will infer the buyer could not have been
unaware of a third-party intellectual property right in the goods are
somewhat broader than the counterfeit furniture case had suggested.
In another case decided in a French court,92 a Spanish company sold
footwear to a French company. The French buyer was sued by a third-party
for infringing a trademark and the buyer paid 300,000 French francs to
settle the infringement claim.93 The buyer then sued the seller of the
footwear for breaching Article 42 of the CISG. The buyer won at trial but
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Colmar, Nov. 13, 2002, 1B 98/01776 (Fr.),
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021113f1.html.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Rouen, Feb. 17, 2000, 1998/710,
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000217f1.html.
93
Id.
85
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on appeal the judgment was overturned.94 The appellate court observed that
the buyer was an “informed professional” and should have known about the
third-party’s trademark rights in France and been able to avoid the
infringement claims.95 Moreover, the court observed that, in supplying the
footwear, the seller complied with instructions from the buyer, and that
Article 42 relieves the seller of liability for an infringement claim when that
is the case.96 If anything, the case illustrates that the provision in Article 42
relieving the seller of liability when it merely complies with instructions
from the buyer can be important.
3. The Scope of the Seller’s Liabilities
Only one accessible case has addressed the scope of the seller’s
liabilities under Article 42 directly. In a case decided in a Dutch court,97 a
Dutch company bought textiles from an Italian company. A third-party
subsequently claimed copyrights in the designs of the textiles and sued the
Dutch buyer.98 The buyer was ordered to pay damages and thereupon sued
the Italian seller asserting, among other things, a breach of Article 42 of the
CISG.99 The Dutch court devoted most of its opinion to clarifying the
applicable law, in the end deciding that Italian law should apply, and that
under Italian law the CISG was applicable.100 What is perhaps most
interesting about the opinion, however, was the court’s ruling that under
Article 42 the buyer must prove that the seller knew or could not have been
unaware of the intellectual property infringement.101 The court thus
appeared to reject the view, expressed by the UN Secretariat during the
legislative history of the CISG, that it should be presumed a seller could not
have been unaware of a third-party intellectual property right when the
intellectual property is publicly recorded under the relevant national
intellectual property system.
One additional Israeli case involving boots also addressed the scope of
a seller’s liabilities under Article 42, although perhaps more obliquely.102 In
that case, an Israeli seller was sued by a Belgian buyer after the boots were
confiscated in transit by U.S. Customs authorities because they violated a
well-known trademark.103 The case was appealed all the way to the Israeli
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Hof, 21 mei 1996, 95/246 AL (Neth.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521n1.html.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
CA 3912/90 Eximin SA v. Itel Style Ferarri Textiles & Shoes Ltd. 47(4) PD 64 (1993) (Isr.).
103
Id.
95
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Supreme Court. Although the Israeli Supreme Court determined that the
Hague Sales Convention should apply, not the CISG, it nonetheless drew an
analogy with the CISG, and split the liabilities between the seller and buyer
because both should have known about the trademark infringement and
were both, therefore, partly to blame.104 The Court correctly reasoned that
under Article 42 the fact that the buyer knew or could not have been
unaware of the trademark would trump the fact that the seller also knew or
could not have been unaware of the trademark and relieve the seller of
liability.105 Interestingly, however, the Court nonetheless held that both
parties should bear part of the liabilities in the case under the good faith
obligations on the parties under Israeli law.106 As the case commentary
notes, to the extent that the Court drew an analogy with the CISG the ruling
may only confound the proper interpretation of Article 42.107 Moreover, the
case illustrates the hazards of applying domestic rules to an international
sales transaction because it can clearly lead to outcomes that appear to be
inconsistent with the CISG.
C. The Important Unanswered Question
Article 42 raises some obvious interpretative questions that neither the
legislative history nor the case law help to answer clearly. First of all,
should the seller be presumed to know about potential third-party
intellectual property claims if the third-party’s intellectual property rights
are registered or created under the domestic laws of the buyer’s location or
the location where the buyer plans to resell the goods? Second, should the
buyer also be presumed to know about a third-party intellectual property
right registered or created in a jurisdiction where the buyer plans to use or
resell the goods?
If the answer to the first question is “yes” and the answer to the second
one is “no,” then the seller presumably should be held liable whenever a
third-party makes a claim against the buyer based on an intellectual
property right in the jurisdiction in which the buyer is located or the
jurisdiction in which the buyer plans to resell the goods. If the answer to the
first question is “no” and the answer to the second one is “yes” then the
buyer presumably should bear the risk of such a claim. If the answer to both
questions is “no,” then the seller presumably should be liable only if the
buyer can prove that the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the
third-party intellectual property right108 without conceding that it also knew
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 42(1) (“The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right
or claim of a third party based on industrial property or other intellectual property, of which at the time
105
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or could not have been unaware of the third-party intellectual property
right;109 of course, if the fact that the intellectual property right is registered
or created under the laws of the buyer’s own jurisdiction or the jurisdiction
in which the buyer plans to resell the goods does not create a presumption
that the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the right, the buyer
will have great difficulty bearing that burden of proof.110
The two questions boil down to the one of central interest to this
article: who should bear the liabilities for a third-party intellectual property
claim based on an intellectual property right registered or created in the
jurisdiction in which the buyer is located or the jurisdiction in which the
buyer plans to resell the goods, the seller or the buyer? To answer that
question correctly, we will need to make the right presumptions about the
parties’ knowledge. Of course, the answer must also accord with the
governing rules and principles of the CISG.
VI. INTERPRETING THE WARRANTY OF TITLE UNDER THE CISG
Contract laws serve both utilitarian and ethical purposes. One of the
important utilitarian purposes of contract laws is to reduce the costs of
transacting, since the lower the transaction costs, the great the potential
gains from trade. Most contract laws—including the CISG—allow the
parties to draft customized terms for their agreements.111 If transaction costs
were zero and the parties were perfectly rational, they would always be able
to draft customized terms for their agreements that would maximize their
joint surplus from transacting.112 Unfortunately, parties are never perfectly
rational and there are significant costs to negotiating, drafting, and
enforcing customized contract terms.113 Given that there are significant
transaction costs, the best that even the most rational parties can hope for is

of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been unaware . . . .”).
109
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 42(2) (“The obligation of the seller under the preceding paragraph
does not extend to cases where (a) at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could
not have been unaware of the right or claim . . . .”).
110
The language of Article 42 appears to make this clear; if there was any uncertainty, this is one
matter that the case law appears to have clarified. See supra Section IV.ii.(b).
111
See CISG supra note 2, art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or,
subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”).
112
This is a basic implication of the Coase Theorem. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 THE J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). As an aside, this is apparently the most cited law review
article of all time. See Shapiro, Fred R. Shapiro and Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012).
113
This is axiomatic and hardly worthy of a citation, but it is worth noting that bounded rationality
and transaction costs are important enough to have provided the foundational assumptions for an entire
school of economic thought, the so-called New Institutional Economics. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson,
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595–613 (2000).
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a contract that allows them to earn as much joint surplus as possible net of
the transaction costs. To that end, contract laws are often helpful because
they provide default rules that the parties may contract under instead of
incurring the significant costs of negotiating and drafting customized
contract terms.114 The CISG provides an important set of contract default
rules and, in many international sales, the parties may rely on the default
rules to govern their transactions. This makes the interpretation of the
CISG’s rules, including Article 42, important to the economic purposes of
the parties.
A. Interpreting the CISG Default Rules Under Article 42
If the parties to an international sale governed by the CISG choose not
to draft a customized warranty of title term, then the default rule in Article
42 will govern whether the seller is liable for a third-party intellectual
property claim against the buyer. If a dispute arises about the interpretation
of Article 42, the clear directive in Article 7(1) is that it should be
interpreted with due regard to the international character of the CISG, the
need to promote uniformity in its application, and the desire to promote
good faith in international trade.115
1. Good Faith in International Trade and Reasonable Commercial
Standards
Unfortunately, it is not necessarily obvious what Article 7(1)’s
admonishment to pay regard to the international character of the CISG and
to promote uniformity in its application and good faith in international trade
implies. At a minimum, the international character of the CISG and the
desire to promote uniformity in international sales argue strongly that courts
should look beyond case precedents from their domestic jurisdictions to
those from foreign ones;116 they may also argue for consulting scholarly
commentary, at least to the extent that it addresses problems of contract
interpretation.117 To the extent that it applies to the interpretation of the
CISG, the promotion of good faith in international trade at a minimum
114

See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS, 217–24 (5th ed. 2008).
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade.”).
116
This has been strongly urged in scholarly commentary and by some courts, although U.S. courts
have not always heeded the admonishment. HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 125–31.
117
John Honnold suggests that Article 7(1) implies courts should consult scholarly writings in
interpreting the CISG. If one accepts that the principles of Article 7(1) should apply to the interpretation
of contract terms under the CISG as well as the CISG itself, then to the extent that scholarly
commentary may offer useful guidance in interpreting specific contract terms, such commentary should
also be consulted. Id.
115
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arguably requires a liberal interpretation of some CISG provisions.118
Beyond that, it may also require an appeal to the reasonableness standard as
well as the practices established between the parties and usages within their
industry.119
Indeed, as John Honnold explains,120 Article 7(1) may have
implications similar to those of the good faith obligation under the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC). Under Article 2 of the UCC, good faith is
defined to mean “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”121 According to the
Official Comments of the UCC, “fair dealing is a broad term … that is
concerned with the fairness of conduct...” and should be “determined in
light of reasonable commercial standards….”.122 The overarching
requirement of good faith under the UUC, therefore, is dictated by reference
to reasonable commercial standards. Since the purpose of most commercial
transactions is to earn profits, reasonable commercial standards presumably
should help to minimize the costs of transacting and allow the parties to
earn, on average, as much joint surplus as possible subject to the
requirement that they are treated fairly.
2. Asymmetric Information and the Policy Purpose of a Warranty of
Title
The economic purposes of the warranty of title should be relevant to
the reasonable commercial standards that guide its application. As a general
matter, the warranty of title helps to reduce transaction costs by alleviating
informational asymmetries and assigning the liabilities associated with
third-party claims against the buyer to the party that is most efficiently able
to avoid them.123 A sales transaction typically entails the transfer of title to
goods for a price. Problems might arise, however, if there is asymmetric
information between sellers and buyers about the “quality”124 of the title
that is being conveyed from the seller to the buyer. For example, suppose
the seller knows there is a third-party who might make a property claim
118

Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 136.
120
Id. See also Troy Keily, Good Faith and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 15 (1999).
121
See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). In fact, this is now the
general definition of good faith under all the Articles of the UCC. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29).
122
U.C.C. § 1-201, cmt. 20.
123
The informational asymmetries can create a so-called “lemons problem.” See, e.g., George A.
Ackerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART.
J. ECON. 488, 489–91 (1970).
124
The reference to “quality” of title refers to the risk of liabilities associated with third-party
property claims against the goods. A title subject to less risk of such claims is obviously better than one
subject to greater risk.
119
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against the goods after the sale but the buyer does not. This constitutes what
is called a “hidden information problem.”125 As a consequence of such a
problem, the buyer might unwittingly pay a higher price for the goods than
they are worth. The mere risk that the seller might have hidden information
bearing on the risks of third-party challenges against the buyer’s title could
therefore discourage the buyer from transacting.
The warranty of title may also help to mitigate information
asymmetries associated with hidden actions, which can create what are
commonly known as “moral hazard” problems.126 For example, the owner
of an automobile could make major repairs with used parts; the used parts
might contain vehicle identification numbers different than those on the
remaining original parts of the automobile.127 If the owner sells the vehicle
to a buyer who is unaware of the used parts, a police stop or other
inspection could disclose the discrepancies to the authorities and may raise
questions about the buyer’s title. The seller’s actions, hidden from the buyer
because they were prior to the sale of the automobile, would thus cause the
buyer to suffer a claim against title to the automobile. The risk that the
seller’s hidden actions might compromise the buyer’s title after a sale
creates a lemons problem of a somewhat different kind than the one created
by hidden information but it is no less of an impediment to sales
transactions.
In theory, the price that buyers are willing to pay for a good depends
on the quality of the title they expect to receive, but buyers often have less
information about the quality of the title than the seller. Since sellers may
have private information that is hidden and cannot be verified by the buyer,
the buyers cannot distinguish the quality of the titles that will be conveyed
by different sellers and they will therefore only pay a price appropriate for
goods with titles of the average quality of all titles of goods of the same
type on the market.128 An individual seller therefore has no incentive to sell
a good whose title is of higher than average quality—or, in other words,
subject to fewer potential third-party claims. In theory, the low quality title
sellers could actually force high quality title sellers out of the market and
buyers could end up with no alternative to low quality title goods, even
though they might be willing to pay a premium for goods with verifiably
125

Economists have distinguished between two basic kinds of asymmetric information problems:
“hidden action” problems and “hidden information” problems. Hidden information problems arise in
situations where one party to a transaction has information that is of value to the other party but the
information cannot be revealed in any simple manner. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and
Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74–91 (1979) (discussing informational asymmetries in economic
problems in a seminal Article).
126
Id. at 74–76.
127
The example is from the classic case, Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 174–75 (S.D. 1995).
128
In fact, they would only pay a price that was appropriate for a product of average quality if they
were risk-neutral; if they were risk-averse they would pay less than that.
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high quality titles.129 The warranty of title may help to mitigate asymmetric
information problems by making the seller liable for third-party claims
against the buyer when the seller knew about the risks but the buyer did not.
Under the CISG a warranty of title will apply by default under Articles
41 and 42 unless the parties draft a customized warranty of title provision
that displaces the CISG’s default rules. If there is a third-party claim against
the buyer or some other defect in title after the sale, the buyer may be
entitled to a remedy, if the claim or defect constitutes a breach of the
warranty.130 The warranty of title thus acts as a kind of insurance policy
provided by the seller in any sale, unless properly waived, that protects the
buyer against third-party property claims against the goods or other defects
in title. To the extent that the warranty of title is well devised, it will
therefore mitigate information asymmetries, reduce the costs of transacting,
and improve the economic efficiency of markets. A well-devised warranty
of title would arguably thus comport with reasonable commercial practices
of fair dealing and promote good faith in international trade, but the
important question is, how should the warranty of title be devised to
mitigate information asymmetries and reduce transaction costs? To be more
specific, what test should be used to determine whether the seller bears the
liability for a claim against the buyer’s title?
3. The Cloud on Title Standard
U.S. courts have generally adopted the “cloud on title” standard in
cases arising under the UCC.131 There is a cloud on title if the buyer’s title
is or may be subjected to a colorable challenge. A colorable challenge is
one which is “not spurious” and casts a “substantial shadow” on the title
such that it is not free from “reasonable doubt.”132 The language is less than
crystal clear and commentators have not surprisingly urged that the UCC
standard be clarified. Nonetheless, it is clear that under the UCC a thirdparty claim against the buyer’s title usually does not have to be valid to
constitute a breach of the seller’s warranty of title.133 It seems equally clear
that a frivolous or spurious claim would not constitute a breach.134
129

In other words, they end up with no alternative but to buy a “lemon.”
Under the CISG, damages might be available under Articles 74–77. See CISG, supra note 2, at
688–89. If the seller’s breach is “fundamental,” as defined in Article 25, the buyer may also be able to
avoid the contract under Article 49. See CISG, supra note 2, at 682.
131
See, e.g., Colton, 540 N.W.2d at 176 (“[M]ere initiation of a colorable challenge, one which is
not spurious, regardless of the outcome, is sufficient to violate the warranty of title.”). In this case, the
court held that the seller was liable for a breach of the warranty of title under the UCC after the buyer’s
vehicle was impounded by state authorities because conflicting vehicle identification numbers on used
parts created a shadow on the buyer’s title. Id. This is an example of a colorable challenge.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
130
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Most of the UCC cases have addressed third-party non-intellectual
property claims against the buyer. In a recent case, however, the Court of
Appeals of California has extended the cloud on title standard to third-party
intellectual property claims against the buyer as well.135 In the Pacific
Sunwear case, the court addressed whether a third-party trademark
infringement claim against a buyer that was denied a summary judgment on
the grounds that the third-party had not “established a likelihood of
confusion”136 and was subsequently settled was sufficient to breach the
seller’s warranty of title under UCC § 2-312(3). The court held that “the
warranty covers a broad scope of infringement claims and is not limited to
claims that ultimately will prove successful in litigation,”137 and thus it
“applies to all claims of infringement that have any significant and adverse
effect on the buyer’s ability to make use of the purchased goods, excepting
only frivolous claims that are completely devoid of merit.”138
The cloud on title standard probably comports with reasonable
commercial standards in a domestic sales transaction. In a purely domestic
sale, the seller can reasonably be presumed to have actual or constructive
knowledge about any potential intellectual property rights claims against
the goods since the intellectual property rights that would provide a basis
for the claims would arise under the laws of the jurisdiction in which both
the seller and buyer are located and the seller therefore should know about
the potential claims prior to the sale. In fact, the seller would be a potential
target for the claims prior to the sale, simply by virtue of using the
intellectual property.139 Thus, it is arguably reasonable to extend the cloud
on title standard commonly used under the UCC for non-intellectual
property warranty of title claims to those that are based on third-party
intellectual property rights claims as well.140
4. The Unique Characteristics of International Sales
In an international sale, however, the seller cannot so easily be
presumed to have constructive or actual knowledge of potential third-party
intellectual property claims against the goods since the seller is typically
located in a jurisdiction other than the one under which the third-party’s
intellectual property rights will be made. The seller would therefore not
135

Pac. Sunwear of Cal., 167 Cal. App. 4th at 481 (“[T]he warranty . . . applies to all claims of
infringement that have any significant and adverse effect on the buyer’s ability to make use of the
purchased goods, excepting only frivolous claims that are devoid of merit . . . .”).
136
Id. at 470.
137
Id. at 481.
138
Id.
139
Blair & Cotter, supra note 11, at 1–4.
140
That does not mean, of course, that the standard cannot be improved. For a suggested refinement,
see Sandrik, supra note 13, at 905–915.

534

36_3_2_SMYTHE FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/16 8:11 PM

Clearing the Clouds on the CISG’s Warranty of Title
36:509 (2016)

normally know much about the intellectual property laws under which any
intellectual property claims might be made. The one exception, which
would apply only in rare and unusual cases, would arise if the buyer re-sold
the goods in the jurisdiction in which the seller was located and the thirdparty claim was based on intellectual property rights created in the seller’s
own jurisdiction. Aside from that exception, the buyer should normally be
presumed to know at least as much as the seller about the laws of the
jurisdiction under which any third-party’s intellectual property claim would
be based.
In an international sale, the buyer is also generally the party that
should be better able to avoid the risks of a third-party intellectual property
claim by searching the jurisdiction’s records in advance of the sales
transaction for registered intellectual property rights that might be infringed
by the goods. The buyer is obviously located in the jurisdiction under which
the claims might be made or plans to resell the goods in a jurisdiction under
which the claims might be made and should therefore be able to conduct a
search of the records at lower cost than the seller. The buyer’s cost savings
would derive not only from the buyer’s physical presence, which should by
itself allow the buyer to conduct the search at lower costs, but also from the
buyer’s greater familiarity with the laws of the jurisdiction, including the
intellectual property laws and the system for registering intellectual
property rights.141 In many sales transactions, the seller will have neither the
time nor the resources or competence to conduct an adequate search of the
intellectual property records in distant and unfamiliar jurisdictions. In fact,
in many cases the seller might not even imagine that any third-party might
make an intellectual property claim. Regardless, the buyer should be
presumed to have at least as much foresight about the possibility of such
claims as the seller and to be better able to forestall the possibility of a title
problem.
The basic problem is analogous to the one involving goods that violate
the local laws, regulations, customs, or standards of the jurisdiction in
which the buyer is located.142 For example, suppose the seller delivers an
141

The buyer arguably should be more familiar than the seller with the laws of its own jurisdiction
and, if it plans to resell the goods in a foreign jurisdiction, arguably should be at least as familiar with
the laws of that jurisdiction as well—unless, of course, the buyer plans to resell the goods in the seller’s
own jurisdiction, an unlikely exception.
142
This is a common problem in sales across jurisdictions and has therefore arisen under the UCC as
well as the CISG. See, e.g., Award Made in Case No. 2129 of 1972, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL
AWARDS 1974–85, at 23 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds., 1990) (automobile parts conformed to
German standards but not to Ohio standards); Award in Case No. 3779 of 1981, in COLLECTION OF ICC
ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974–85, at 138 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds., 1990) (whey powder
conformed to contract when tested by North American methods but not when test by European
methods), Medical Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No. CIV. A. 990380, 1999 WL 311945 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999) (mammography machines complied with Italian
regulations but did not comply with FDA regulations).
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expensive piece of medical equipment to the buyer, but the equipment
violates health regulations in the buyer’s jurisdiction even though it
complies with those in the seller’s jurisdiction.143 Who should bear the
liabilities, the seller or the buyer? As a general matter, the buyer probably
should be more familiar with the health regulations in its own jurisdiction
than the seller. The seller may not have made any other sales or have had
any other operations or business in the buyer’s jurisdiction. The buyer, on
the other hand, is not only located in its own jurisdiction, but obviously
plans to use or resell the seller’s medical equipment in that jurisdiction. As
a general matter, therefore, the buyer is in a better position to know about
the health regulations, and to take any actions necessary to forestall
compliance problems. Policy considerations thus generally support
assigning liabilities for noncompliance with local laws or regulations to the
buyer to help alleviate informational asymmetries that might otherwise
impede or inhibit efficient transactions.
There is a strong analogy between questions about whether the seller
should be liable for claims against the buyer because of the failure of goods
to conform to the laws or regulations in the buyer’s jurisdiction and
questions about whether the seller should be liable for claims against the
buyer because the goods infringe on a third-party’s rights under the
intellectual property laws in the buyer’s jurisdiction. If goods fail to comply
with regulations in the buyer’s jurisdiction, then the buyer may be subject to
a claim by the government. If goods infringe on an intellectual property
right under intellectual property laws in the buyer’s jurisdiction, then the
buyer may be subject to a claim by a third-party who owns the intellectual
property right. In each case, the claims against the buyer arise under the
laws of the buyer’s jurisdiction. Both cases, therefore, raise questions about
whether the seller or buyer should bear the liabilities for claims arising
under the laws of the buyer’s jurisdiction.
5. A German Supreme Court Precedent in an Analogous Case
There is, in fact, some persuasive authority under the CISG that
supports assigning liabilities to the buyer cases where goods fail to comply
with laws or regulations in the buyer’s jurisdiction. The German Supreme
Court addressed a question under the CISG about whether the failure of
goods to conform to local regulations constituted a breach of Article 35 in
Entscheidunger des Bundersgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen.144 In that case, a
143

This is not a warranty of title issue since it does not involve any defect in, or claim against, the
buyer’s title to the goods. Under the U.C.C. it is probably best treated as a warranty of merchantability
issue under U.C.C. § 2-314 or a warranty of fitness issue under U.C.C. § 2-315. Under the CISG it
would probably be best treated under the analogous provisions in CISG Article 35(2)(a) or 35(2)(b).
144
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS
IN
ZIVILSACHEN
[BGHZ]
129,
75–86,
1995
(Ger.),
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Swiss company sold a large order of mussels to a German buyer. The
mussels conformed to the contract description of the goods, but did not
comply with the cadmium concentration limits recommended by the
German health authorities.145 Although the mussels were not sufficiently
high in cadmium for the German authorities to consider them unsuitable for
consumption, they were high enough in cadmium to be considered “not
harmless” and the buyer wanted to return them and declare the contract
avoided under CISG Article 49.146 The seller won at trial and the buyer
subsequently appealed.147 On the first appeal, the German Court of Appeals
observed that the contract did not expressly indicate whether the laws of the
seller’s or buyer’s jurisdiction applied, but in any case declined to hold that
the lack of conformity with German law constituted a fundamental breach
under CISG Article 25, as required for the buyer to avoid the contract under
CISG Article 49.
On further appeal, to the German Supreme Court observed:
The mere fact that the mussels should be delivered to the storage
facility in G.G. does not necessarily constitute an agreement
regarding the resalability of the goods . . . in Germany, and it
definitely does not constitute an agreement regarding the compliance
with certain public law provisions on which the resalability may
depend.148

The Court therefore undertook an extensive survey of the commentary on
questions about whether the “ordinary uses” and “fitness for a for a
particular purpose” provisions under CISG Article 35(2((a) and 2(b)
required that the mussels conform with the law of the buyer’s jurisdiction,
and concluded that “it is not important for the purposes of subsection . . .
[35(2)(a)] . . . whether the use of the goods conflicts with public law
provisions of the import country.” The Court further reasoned:
In any event, certain standards in the buyer’s country can only be
taken into account if they exist in the seller’s country as well . . . or
if, and this should possibly be examined within the scope of CISG
Art. 35(2)(b), the buyer has pointed them out to the seller . . . and,
thereby, relied on and was allowed to rely on the seller’s expertise
or, maybe, if the relevant provisions in the anticipated export country
are known or should be known to the seller due to the particular
circumstances of the case.149

http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
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The analogy between the question of whether goods are defective
because they fail to conform to the laws or regulations in the buyer’s
jurisdiction and the question of whether title to goods is defective because
of a third-party intellectual property claim under the laws or regulations of
the buyer’s jurisdiction (or the jurisdiction in which the buyer plans to resell
the goods) makes the German Supreme Court’s opinion relevant and
compelling. Since Article 7(1) directs courts to interpret the CISG to
promote uniformity in its application and good faith in international trade,
and since those arguable require that analogous cases be treated in similar
ways, Entscheidunger des Bundersgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen has great
persuasive force. In fact, Entscheidunger des Bundersgerichtshofs in
Zivilsachen has been cited favorably by a U.S. court in Medical Marketing
Int’l,150 which summarized the rule as follows:
A seller is generally not obligated to supply goods that conform to
public laws and regulations at the buyer’s place of business . . .
[T]his general rule carries with it exceptions in three limited
circumstances: (1) if the public laws and regulations of the buyer’s
state are identical to those enforced in the seller’s state, (2) if the
buyer informed the seller about those regulations, or (3) if due to
“special circumstances,” such as the existence of a seller’s branch
office in the buyer’s state, the seller knew or should have known
about the regulations at issue.151

Since registering or otherwise creating intellectual property rights in
one jurisdiction does not generally provide a right to make an infringement
claim in another jurisdiction, the first of the limited exceptions summarized
by the court in Medical Marketing Int’l is inapt. There is, however, an
analogous, if unlikely, scenario. It is theoretically possible that the buyer
could resell the goods in the seller’s own jurisdiction. Of course, the seller
should be aware of any third-party intellectual property rights registered or
created under the laws of its own jurisdiction—in that case, the third-party
could sue the seller regardless of whether the sale occurred.152
6. A Rule for Applying Article 42
One can draw on the analogy between claims based on the failure of
goods to conform to local laws or regulations and claims based on thirdparty intellectual property rights, to suggest a rule to govern the application
of Article 42 as follows: the seller in a CISG contract should only be held
150

Medical Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No. CIV. A. 99-0380,
1999 WL 311945, at *2(E.D. La. May 17, 1999).
151
Id.
152
Blair & Cotter, supra note 11, at 1–4.
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liable under Article 42 for third-party intellectual property claims against
the buyer if (1) the buyer resells the goods in the seller’s jurisdiction and
the claim arises under the intellectual property laws in the seller’s
jurisdiction, (2) the buyer informed the seller about the third party’s
intellectual property rights prior to contracting, or (3) due to special
circumstances, such as the seller having a branch in the jurisdiction under
which the third party’s intellectual property rights are registered, or the
seller but not the buyer knew or should have known about the third party’s
intellectual property rights.153
B. Interpreting Customized Contract Terms
In some cases, especially where the stakes are high and the parties are
relatively sophisticated, the parties might decide to draft a customized
warranty of title term. Since the CISG expressly authorizes the parties to
contract around almost all of its default rules, courts would generally
respect the parties’ customized contract term, and so the mere fact that the
parties drafted one would not raise any issues.154 Of course, if the parties
subsequently had a dispute about the meaning of their customized warranty
of title contract term, the task of interpreting it might be put to the courts.
The CISG does not provide any bright lines rules to govern the
interpretation of parties’ customized contract terms, but it does offer some
guidance, especially in Article 8. Article 8(1) states that statements made by
a party are to be determined by the party’s subjective intent where the other
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.155
Unfortunately, Article 8(1) will rarely apply. Article 8(2) states that where
Article 8(1) does not apply, statements made by a party are to be interpreted
according to the understanding of a reasonable person of the same kind as
the other party in the same circumstances.156 What is perhaps most
interesting about Article 8(2) is not that it uses a reasonableness standard,
but that it implies a party’s statements should be interpreted according to
how the other party should reasonably have interpreted them. Article 8(2)
therefore appears to imply that if one of the parties drafts a writing for a
153

The special circumstances noted are only illustrative. There might be many other circumstances
that justify assigning liabilities to the seller. For example, the seller might be a large, sophisticated
corporation that has previously made many sales in the jurisdiction under which the third-party’s claim
arises, and the buyer, on the other hand, might be a much less sophisticated actor dealing in goods of the
particular kind for the first time.
154
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 6.
155
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(1) (“[S]tatements made by and or other conduct of a party are to
be determined by his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent
was.”).
156
CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(2) (“[S]tatements made by and or other of a party are to be determined
according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have
had in the same circumstances.”).
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contract and there is a dispute about the interpretation of one of the terms, a
court should interpret the term in the same way that a reasonable person of
the same kind as the other party in the dispute would have done under the
same circumstances.157 It appears to be similar to the contra proferentem
rule that is commonly used to resolve contract interpretation disputes in the
United States,158 although it may not disfavor the drafter quite so much as it
favors the reasonableness of the interpretation. Since customized contract
terms are commonly drafted by the party with more resources and
experience,159 Article 8(2) seems both reasonable and fair.
Although it may not be obvious that Article 8(2) applies to contract
interpretation when both of the parties participated in drafting the contract
terms, upon some reflection it also appears to imply that courts should
apply a reasonableness standard in interpreting contract terms that were
jointly drafted. Presumably, if both parties took a role in drafting a contract
term they should each be treated as having made a statement expressing the
term through their participation in the drafting process and their expression
of the term should be interpreted according to how a reasonable person of
the same kind as the other party to the contract would have done under the
same circumstances.160 Article 8(2) thus appears to direct courts to interpret
a jointly drafted contract term in the same way that a reasonable person of
the same kind as each of the parties under the same circumstances would
have interpreted it. Since an interpretation of a contract term that is
construed as reasonable from each of the opposing parties’ sides (instead of
from only one side) could only be described as “reasonable,” Article 8(2)
appears to direct courts to apply a version of a reasonableness standard in
interpreting jointly drafted contract terms.161
Unfortunately, the application of Article 8(2)’s reasonableness
standard may not be as simple as it initially appears. If the parties have a
genuine interpretive dispute, it may be possible that, relative to each of
them, a person in the position of the other party could have a reasonable
157

HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 158.
Id.
159
See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (classic Article exploring the implications of unequal bargaining power
for the contractual writings drafted by the parties).
160
The language of Article 8(2) refers to “statements . and other conduct” of a party. See CISG,
supra note 2, art. 8(2). Presumably, a written contract term that was drafted or jointly drafted by a party
should be treated as a statement by that party and should, therefore, be subject to Article 8(2).
161
This should not be surprising. A reasonableness standard is stated in several CISG provisions.
Indeed, one distinguished commentator has claimed that a reasonableness standard is one of the general
principles on which the CISG is based. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 21 (1986) (“[That] the parties
must conduct themselves according to the standard of the ‘reasonable person,’ which is expressly
described in a number of provisions and, therefore, according to Article 7(2), must be regarded as a
general principle of the Convention.”).
158
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interpretation of the contract term under the same circumstances that
differed from their own. In fact, it may be possible that, relative to each of
the parties, a reasonable person in the position of the other party could have
more than one—perhaps even several—reasonable interpretations of the
term.162 In other words, relative to each of the parties, Article 8(2) might
imply a set of multiple reasonable interpretations that could be imputed to
the other party. Since a reasonable interpretation would have to be mutually
reasonable, it would have to lie in the intersection of the sets of reasonable
interpretations that could be imputed to each of the parties. Article 8(2)
would thus imply three possibilities.163 The intersection of the sets of
reasonable interpretations could (1) identify a unique reasonable
interpretation of the term,164 (2) identify a set of more than one reasonable
interpretations of the term,165 or (3) might not identify any reasonable
interpretation of the term.166 If Article 8(2) identified a unique reasonable
interpretation, then that would arguably be the one a court should apply.
But what if Article 8(2) did not identify a unique reasonable interpretation,
either because it identified multiple reasonable interpretations or none at
all?
As several scholars have observed,167 Article 8(3) directs courts to
look beyond any contract writing to almost any extrinsic evidence bearing
on the meaning of a contract term.168 Although the extrinsic evidence might
162

The language of Article 8(2) seems to overlook this possibility, since it uses the definite article
when it refers to “the understanding that a reasonable person . . . would have had in the same
circumstances.” But it also uses the indefinite article in referring to “a reasonable person.” Since
reasonable people can disagree, they could in principle have different understandings of a contract term
under the same circumstances. Thus, in applying Article 8(2) a court could contemplate the different
understandings that more than different reasonable persons could have had of a contract term under the
same circumstances. CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(2).
163
It is tempting but unnecessary to draw Venn diagrams. Nonetheless, readers who are so inclined
may like to conceptualize the alternatives in set-theoretic terms. To that end, let P1 denote the set of
reasonable interpretations that could be imputed to the first party, and let P2 denote the set of reasonable
interpretations that could be imputed to the second party.
164
In other words, the intersection of P1 and P2 might consist of a single mutually reasonable
interpretation. This we could rightly call a unique reasonable interpretation of the contract term.
165
One alternative possibility is that the intersection of P1 and P2 might consist of more than one
mutually reasonable interpretation. Under the application of Article 8(2), the contract term would thus
be ambiguous.
166
A third and final possibility is that intersection of P1 and P2 might consist of the null set—that is,
it might not include any mutually reasonable interpretations. In this case, Article 8(2) would not imply
any interpretation of the contract terms at all, even any ambiguous ones.
167
See, e.g., Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG,
CISG Advisory Opinion No. 3 (Oct. 23 2004), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op3.html.
But see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 150
(1999).
168
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 8(3) (“[D]ue consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established
between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.”).
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be helpful in many cases, it could also confound an interpretive problem
and increase the number of possible reasonable interpretations of a contract
term since reasonable people might (reasonably) rely on different extrinsic
evidence in arriving at their understandings of what the contract term
entails. Article 9 might also bear importantly on an interpretation problem.
Article 9(1) implies that the parties are bound by what those familiar with
the UCC would consider usages of trade, course of dealings, or courses of
performance.169 Of course, these are simply other kinds of extrinsic
evidence and, while they may be helpful in many cases, they might also
confound contract interpretations in others. The greater the range of the
extrinsic evidence admitted, the more likely the evidence will imply
contradictions and multiple reasonable interpretations of a contract term.
The question thus remains: what if Article 8(2) in conjunction with all the
available extrinsic evidence fails to identify a unique reasonable contract
interpretation?
Article 7(1) suggests an answer. Article 7(1) directs courts to interpret
the CISG with regard to its international character and the need to promote
uniformity in its application and good faith in international trade.170 Of
course, on its face, Article 7(1) expressly governs only the interpretation of
the CISG’s own rules, not any contract terms that displace them.
Nonetheless, one could argue that Article 7(1)’s directive to interpret the
CISG to promote uniformity in its application and good faith in
international trade reflects underlying principles of the CISG.171 Since
Article 7(1) directs courts to resolve questions concerning matters governed
by the CISG but for which the Articles of the CISG do not expressly
provide an answer by applying the principles on which the CISG is based, it
arguably implies that courts should interpret contract terms to promote
uniformity in international sales law and good faith in international trade in
cases where both of the parties drafted them but Article 8(2) does not imply
a unique interpretation. In other words, Article 7(1), in conjunction with
169

See CISG, supra note 2, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed
and by any practice which they have established between themselves.”). Article 9(2) clarifies that the
parties impliedly agree to any usages which they ought to have know about. CISG, supra note 2, art.
9(2) (“The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their
contract . . . a usage of which [they] knew or ought to have known.”).
170
See CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade.”).
171
There is a long-standing debate about how liberal courts should be in construing the general
principles on which the CISG is based. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 146–48; see also Camilla
Baasch Andersen, General Principles of the CISG—Generally Impenetrable?, in SHARING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 13 (Camilla B. Andersen &
Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008); Andre Janssen, The CISG and Its General Principles, in CISG
METHODOLOGY 261 (Andre Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009); Joseph Lookofsky, Walking the Article
7(2) Tightrope Between CISG and Domestic Law, 25 J.L. & COM. 87 (2005).
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any extrinsic evidence admissible under Articles 8(3) and 9, might help
courts to select a single (and obviously reasonable) interpretation of a
contract term if Article 8(2) either suggests multiple reasonable
interpretations or none at all.
Most scholars and commentators appear to agree that courts should use
Article 8 to interpret contract terms under the CISG,172 but to the author’s
knowledge, no one has specifically addressed whether Article 7(1) implies
principles that courts could use to interpret contract terms when their use of
Article 8 fails to resolve difficult interpretive problems.173 Nonetheless,
many commentators have argued for construing the principles on which the
CISG is based broadly. John Honnold, for example, emphasizes the
importance of the character and texture of a body of rules and characterizes
most of the CISG’s provisions, presumably including Article 7(1),174 as
what others have referred to as “muddy standards”175 in contrast to “sharpedged” rules.176 As Honnold argues, “a code that lays down general
principles to cover a wide variety of transactions and is expected to endure,
calls for an approach very different from tax laws and similar legislation
that is written in great detail and is subject to frequent legislative
adjustment.”177 Thus, he believes the CISG’s rules and the principles on
which they are based should be construed broadly to help achieve the larger
purpose of international legal codification and unification.178 As Honnold
and many other scholars view the matter,179 the risk of construing the CISG
172

See, e.g., CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3, supra note 167; HONNOLD, supra note 6, at
153–54; SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), ART. 8, (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 2nd ed. 2005).
173
Of course, it might be possible to identify other principles of the CISG that could be used to aid
in contract interpretation. Peter Schlechtriem, for example, might argue that reasonableness is a
sufficiently general principle of the CISG that it should govern contract interpretations when Article 8(2)
is unavailing. Under a broad construction of such a reasonable principle, a court could apply its own
reasonable interpretation of a contract term instead of applying the algorithm in Article 8(2) that requires
contemplation of the understandings of reasonable persons. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 168.
174
Honnold does not expressly state that Article 7(1) provides more of a standard than a sharpedged rule, but he does not list it among the rules that he describes as sharp-edged. HONNOLD, supra
note 6, at 150.
175
The classic Article is Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
577–78 (1988).
176
HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 150.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 151–52. Of course, not everyone agrees. Indeed, one scholar has argued that the goal of
uniformity comes at the expense of other important values, and that a homeward trend bias, which
would result from construing the principles of the CISG narrowly, might improve the legitimacy of the
CISG over the long-term. See Karen Halverson Cross, Parole Evidence Under the CISG: The
“Homeward Trend” Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 138 (2007).
179
HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 147; see Michael Joachim Bonell, General Provisions: Article 7, in
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 2.2.1
(C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., 1987) (“[T]he Convention . . . is intended to replace all rules in legal
systems previously governing matters within its scope. . . . This means that in applying the Convention
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and its principles narrowly is that this opens the door to the gap-filling
provision in Article 7(2) which allows recourse to domestic laws to resolve
questions arising under the CISG and thus threatens to make international
sales law less uniform.180
To the extent that Article 7(1) implies principles on which the CISG is
based, therefore, it arguably implies the following: (1) if Article 8(2), in
conjunction with all the admissible extrinsic evidence, does not provide a
unique reasonable interpretation of a contract term, courts should choose
from among the possible reasonable interpretations suggested by Article
8(2) the one that best comports with Article 7(1)’s admonishment to
promote uniformity in the application of the CISG and good faith in
international trade; and (2) if Article 8(2), in conjunction with all the
admissible extrinsic evidence, does not suggest any reasonable
interpretations of a contract term, courts should choose an interpretation
that best comports with the admonishment of Article 7(1) to promote
uniformity in the application of the CISG and good faith in international
trade. Since good faith in international trade arguably implies the need for
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,181 this should at least
provide a reasonable interpretation of the contract term under the CISG.
Unless the contract term clearly indicated that a different rule should apply,
it would also result in the application of the same rule as the one courts
should apply under Article 42. Thus, it would help to further the coherence
and uniformity of international jurisprudence under the CISG as well.
Ultimately, therefore, the backstop in interpreting a customized
warranty of title provision—or any other customized contract term—under
the CISG should be provided by the general principles of Article 7(1). Since
Article 7(1) also governs the interpretation of all of the provisions in the
CISG that would otherwise apply to parties’ contracts by default, including
the warranty of title provisions under Article 42, this implies that unless the
parties’ contract clearly indicates otherwise, the warranty of title under a
contract governed by the CISG should be interpreted to promote uniformity
in its application and good faith in international trade. Thus, unless the
parties’ contract clearly indicates otherwise, the seller in a CISG contract
should only be held liable for third-party intellectual property claims

there is no valid reason to adopt a narrow interpretation.”); Bruno Zeller, The UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Good—A Leap Forward towards Unified International Sales
Laws, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 79, 105–06 (2000). But see, e.g., Cross, supra note 185.
180
Not everyone agrees with the goal of achieving uniformity in international sales. Clayton P.
Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law 2-4b (N.Y.U. Law &
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005) (arguing that sophisticated parties will generally prefer
to draft their own customized contract terms and choose the law that applies to their agreements, and
that the CISG thus only offers a useful alternative if the transaction costs of drafting customized contract
terms are very high, but the transaction costs are not that high).
181
See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 6, at 136; Keily, supra note 120, at 15.
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against the buyer under a customized warranty of title contract term if (1)
the buyer resells the goods in the seller’s jurisdiction and the claim arises
under the intellectual property laws in the seller’s jurisdiction, (2) the buyer
informed the seller about the third-party’s intellectual property rights prior
to contracting, or (3) due to special circumstances, such as the seller having
a branch in the jurisdiction under which the third-party’s intellectual
property rights are registered, the seller but not the buyer knew or should
have known about the third-party’s intellectual property rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The risk of intellectual property infringement claims appears to pose
an increasing threat to international trade. Important questions will
inevitably arise under the CISG, therefore, about the scope of the seller’s
warranty of title and courts will be called upon to interpret Article 42 of the
CISG, which provides a warranty of title governing third-party intellectual
property claims, or the parties’ contract if they draft a customized warranty
of title term. Unfortunately, the CISG’s legislative history and the CISG
case law construing Article 42 do not offer much help. The underlying
policy of the warranty of title in a sales transaction, on the other hand,
clearly implies that Article 42 should be interpreted to mitigate
informational asymmetries and reduce transactions costs, and in an
international sales transaction, this generally favors assigning liabilities for
third-party intellectual property claims to the buyer.
Similar policy considerations and the weight of scholarly commentary
on an analogous question also arising under the CISG have motivated the
German Supreme Court to state a rule that assigns liabilities to the buyer,
subject to certain exceptions, when goods fail to conform to the laws or
regulations of the buyer’s jurisdiction. When translated to questions about
sellers’ liabilities for third-party intellectual property claims against buyers
under the CISG, the rule implies that, unless the parties’ contract clearly
indicates otherwise, the seller under a contract governed by the CISG
should only be held liable for third-party intellectual property claims
against the buyer if (1) the buyer resells the goods in the seller’s jurisdiction
and the claim arises under the intellectual property laws in the seller’s
jurisdiction, (2) the buyer informed the seller about the third-party’s
registered intellectual property rights prior to contracting, or (3) due to
special circumstances, such as the seller having a branch in the jurisdiction
under which the third-party’s intellectual property rights are registered, the
seller but not the buyer knew or should have known about the third-party’s
intellectual property rights. This is the rule that will best promote
uniformity in the application of the CISG and good faith in international
trade.
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